83 The Italian Law Journal [Vol. 09 – No. 01
known as the ‘risk theory of profit’.
22
The idea centered on the premise that the
risk generated by a firm through its economic activity is a risk that needed to be
considered as a cost of production. Theories of liability that were developed based
on the risk theory of profit reframed negligence liability by creating a presumption
of liability on the person who generated the risk, unless proven otherwise.
23
This
intellectual evolution led to the paradigms of strict liability or semi-strict liability
and the broader use of legal presumptions of negligence.
From a functional perspective, rules of presumed negligence should not be
confused with the Common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under the rule of
res ipsa loquitur, courts depart from the traditional presumption of non-negligence
because the facts are so obvious that requiring parties to argue any further would
be redundant and contrary to procedural economy.
24
This principle of law, also
known in Germany as prima facie-Beweiss, is particularly widespread in other
civil law systems: the fact that a harm has occurred provides prima facie evidence
of the wrongdoer’s negligence.
25
In several European jurisdictions, drivers of vehicles not guided by rails (ie,
vehicles other than trains), are presumed negligent and thus face semi-strict
22
For a presentation of the legal socialism movement and the risk theory of profit developed by
A. Loria, see G. Frezza and F. Parisi, Achille Loria (1847-1943) (Elgar Companion to Law and
Economics, J.G. Backhaus ed, 1999), 392–402.
23
M. Philonenko, ‘Faute et risque créé par les énergies accumulées’ Revue trimestrielle de
droit civil, 305 (1950).
24
See A. Guerra, B. Luppi and F. Parisi, ‘Do Presumptions of Negligence Incentivize
Optimal Precautions?’ 53 European Journal of Law and Economics, 511-533 (2022). According
to the exemplary quote of Chief Justice Erle, ‘there must be reasonable evidence of negligence.
But where the thing is shown to be under the management and control of the defendant or his
servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.’ Scott v. London & St.
Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 685; see also Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep.
299, 300–01. In the US, a minority of states find that res ipsa loquitur creates a presumption of
negligence, including California and Colorado. See, eg, Blackwell v. Hurst, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Stone’s Farm Supply, Inc. v. Deacon, 805 P.2d 1109 (Col. 1991).
25
See P.G. Monateri, La responsabilità civile. Le fonti delle obbligazioni (Torino: UTET,
1998), 11; V. Fineschi, ‘Res ipsa loquitur: un principio in divenire nella definizione della responsabilità
medica’ Rivista italiana medicina legale, 419 (1989). Along these lines, the Italian Supreme Court
affirmed that ‘in matters of tort liability, it is up to the plaintiff, who sues for damages, to put
forth evidence of the injurer’s negligence; this principle, however, does not necessarily imply that
the judge requires negligence be proven exclusively from the evidence offered by the injured party,
as the proof can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the specific case. The evidence
can also be presumptive, and, in this regard, a fact can be inferred circumstantially due to the id
quod plerumque accidit rule, taking into consideration that it is not always easy to acquire direct
evidence.’ That specific case dealt with products liability, and more specifically, involved a bottling
company sued for damage caused by the bursting of a bottle containing a carbonated beverage.
Corte di Cassazione 28 October 1980 no 5795; G. Monateri, above, 111. There is no general rule
that indicates when it is possible to apply res ipsa loquitur or other presumptive inferences based
on the id quod plerumque accidit because they are called upon to operate based on circumstantial
evidence and findings of the specific case. ibid 114.