9
lower court, the judge is to apply the rule or, if he or she determines that the ratio decidendi does not apply,
they can consider whether to distinguish it and articulate another rule to be applied instead (of course, they
might decide that although not strictly bound by the previous authority, the reason for the rule it laid down
does extend to cover the case at hand).
34
When a judge distinguishes an earlier case, they add or subtract
factors thought to be of sufficient importance to take the case outside the rule.
The precedent rule, by which a norm formulated by a superior court is imposed on a lower court, is
therefore a bright-line rule: if it applies, it is an indefeasible, pre-formulated crystallisation of the resultant
of the vectors of competing values which must be applied to the present case. The operation of precedent
is an important means of ensuring that the law is clear and predictable.
35
However, such values may come
at the price of flexibility. From the late nineteenth century until the 1966 Practice Statement was issued,
36
the House of Lords could not depart from its previous decisions at all.
37
This inflexibility led to what has
been described as “judicial gymnastics” as the Law Lords sought to distinguish precedent that they did not
wish to follow
38
. That was itself damaging to certainty and consistency, the very values the rule sought to
promote.
39
By 1966, there was an acceptance that greater flexibility was needed to enable the court to
correct wrong turns and to enable the common law to develop in response to changes in society.
40
The
previous bright-line rule was an imperfect balance of competing values requiring reformulation.
So the question arises at the highest level: when can a judge overturn precedent?
The nature of the rule depends both on the court applying the rule and the court which originally formulated
it. In broad terms, focusing on the superior courts in England and Wales, (i) High Court judges are bound
by decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and (ii) the Court of Appeal is bound by
decisions of the Supreme Court.
41
Further rules are introduced when it comes to courts of co-ordinate
jurisdiction. So, in broad terms (a) High Court judges are not technically bound by decisions of their peers,
but they should generally follow a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction unless there is a powerful
reason for not doing so;
42
(b) subject to limited exceptions, the Court of Appeal will bind itself;
43
and (c)
34
See generally, “Law and Value in Adjudication” in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
(1979).
35
See, for example, Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 9, para 21 (Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale).
36
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234.
37
The doctrine of self-binding precedent is usually attributed to London Tramways v London County Council [1898] AC 375. However,
the rule that the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was bound by its own previous decisions can be traced to earlier
decisions. See David Pugsley, “London Tramways (1898)” (1996) 17 Journal of Legal History 172 and Louis Blom-Cooper, “1966
and All That: The Story of the Practice Statement”, in Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Bickson and Gavin Drewry (eds), The Judicial
House of Lords 1876–2009 (Oxford University Press, 2009), Ch. 9, 129.
38
Neil Duxbury, “Final Court Jurisprudence in the Crystallisation Era” (2023) 139 LQR 153, 159.
39
R v National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Hudson [1972] AC 944, 966 (Lord Reid).
40
See Louis Blom-Cooper, “1966 and All That: The Story of the Practice Statement”, n 33 above; Alan Paterson, Final Judgment:
The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 2013), 263–8.
41
Willers v Gubay [2016] UKSC 44, para 5.
42
Ibid., para 9; Roberts (A Child) v Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association-Forces Help [2019] EWHC 1104 (QB); [2019] 5
WLUK 34.
43
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co [1944] K.B. 718; [1944] 2 All E.R. 293.